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We give the ﬁrst representation-independent hardness results for PAC learning intersections
of halfspaces, a central concept class in computational learning theory. Our hardness
results are derived from two public-key cryptosystems due to Regev, which are based
on the worst-case hardness of well-studied lattice problems. Speciﬁcally, we prove that a
polynomial-time algorithm for PAC learning intersections of n halfspaces (for a constant
 > 0) in n dimensions would yield a polynomial-time solution to O˜ (n1.5)-uSVP (unique
shortest vector problem). We also prove that PAC learning intersections of n low-weight
halfspaces would yield a polynomial-time quantum solution to O˜ (n1.5)-SVP and O˜ (n1.5)-
SIVP (shortest vector problem and shortest independent vector problem, respectively).
Our approach also yields the ﬁrst representation-independent hardness results for learning
polynomial-size depth-2 neural networks and polynomial-size depth-3 arithmetic circuits.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A halfspace in n dimensions is a Boolean function of the form a1x1 + · · · + anxn  θ , where a1, . . . ,an, θ are integers.
Halfspace-based learning methods have important applications in almost every area of computer science, including data
mining, artiﬁcial intelligence, and computer vision. A natural and important extension of the concept class of halfspaces is
the concept class of intersections of halfspaces. While many eﬃcient algorithms exist for PAC learning a single halfspace,
the problem of learning the intersection of even two halfspaces remains a central challenge in computational learning
theory, and a variety of eﬃcient algorithms have been developed for natural restrictions of the problem [17,18,21,31] (for a
deﬁnition of the PAC model see Section 2). Attempts to prove that the problem is hard have been met with limited success:
all known hardness results for the general problem of PAC learning intersections of halfspaces apply only to the case of
proper learning, where the output hypothesis must be of the same form as the unknown concept.
1.1. Our results
We obtain the ﬁrst representation-independent hardness results for PAC learning intersections of halfspaces. By
“representation-independent,” we mean that we place no restrictions on the learner’s output hypothesis other than
polynomial-time computability. Assuming the intractability of the lattice problems uSVP (unique shortest vector problem),
SVP (shortest vector problem), or SIVP (shortest independent vector problem), we prove that there is no polynomial-time
PAC learning algorithm for intersections of n halfspaces (for any  > 0). The above lattice problems are widely believed to
be hard [24].
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our hardness-of-learning results. We will therefore not attempt to summarize the vast literature on the complexity of lattice
problems and instead refer the reader to several works by Regev [26,27] and Aharonov and Regev [1]. We sketch the lattice
problems brieﬂy in Section 2.
Our hardness results apply even to intersections of light halfspaces, i.e., halfspaces whose weight |θ | + ∑ni=1 |ai | is
bounded by a polynomial in n. We ﬁrst state our hardness results for intersections of arbitrary halfspaces. Throughout
this paper, “PAC learnable” stands for “learnable in the PAC model in polynomial time.”
Theorem 1.1. Assume that intersections of n halfspaces in n dimensions are PAC-learnable for some constant  > 0. Then there is a
polynomial-time solution to O˜ (n1.5)-uSVP.
With a different (incomparable) hardness assumption, we obtain an intractability result for learning intersections of light
halfspaces, a less powerful concept class:
Theorem 1.2. Assume that intersections of n light halfspaces in n dimensions are PAC-learnable for some constant  > 0. Then there
is a polynomial-time quantum solution to O˜ (n1.5)-SVP and O˜ (n1.5)-SIVP.
Oded Regev has informed us that Theorem 1.1 also applies to light halfspaces; see Remark 5.1 for details.
We note here that we can prove something slightly stronger than what is stated in Theorem 1.2. That is, if intersections
of n light halfspaces in n dimensions are PAC-learnable, we obtain a polynomial-time solution to the LWE (“Learning With
Errors”) problem, a version of the noisy parity learning problem over larger ﬁelds (see Regev [24] for details).
These hardness results extend to polynomial-size depth-2 neural networks as follows:
Theorem 1.3. Assume that depth-2 polynomial-size circuits of majority gates are PAC learnable. Then there is a polynomial-time
solution to O˜ (n1.5)-uSVP and polynomial-time quantum solutions to O˜ (n1.5)-SVP and O˜ (n1.5)-SIVP.
Finally, we prove a hardness result for learning depth-3 arithmetic circuits:
Theorem 1.4. Assume that depth-3 polynomial-size arithmetic circuits are PAC-learnable in polynomial time. Then there is a
polynomial-time quantum solution to O˜ (n1.5)-SVP and O˜ (n1.5)-SIVP.
We are not aware of any previous representation-independent hardness results for learning small-depth arithmetic cir-
cuits.
A natural question to ask is whether our approach can yield hardness results for other classes such as AC0 or, more
ambitiously, polynomial-size DNF formulas. In Section 6 we show that the decryption functions of the cryptosystems we
use contain PARITY as a subfunction, so we cannot directly apply this approach.
Remark. In a recent work, Feldman et al. [7] have independently obtained a result very similar to Theorem 1.3. They show
that a polynomial-time algorithm for learning depth-2 polynomial-size majority circuits would break the Ajtai–Dwork cryp-
tosystem. In contrast, our work makes use of more recent cryptosystems due to Regev (the security of Regev’s cryptosystems
is based on weaker assumptions than the ones used by Ajtai and Dwork).
1.2. Previous results
In his fundamental paper on learning, Valiant [30] established a cryptographic hardness result for learning polynomial-
size circuits. Kearns and Valiant [12] used number-theoretic problems (inverting the RSA function, deciding quadratic
residuosity, and factoring Blum integers) to obtain hardness results for NC1 circuits, constant-depth threshold circuits TC0,
and deterministic ﬁnite automata. Kharitonov [15] obtained hardness results for AC1 and NC1 circuits based on the conjec-
tured hardness of the subset sum problem. Kharitonov [14] later used the Blum–Blum–Shub pseudorandom generator [6]
to obtain a hardness result for learning AC0 and TC0 that holds even under the uniform distribution and if membership
queries are allowed.
Hardness results of any kind for learning intersections of halfspaces, by contrast, have seen quite limited progress. Until
recently, the problem was known to be hard only for proper learning: if the learner’s output hypothesis must be from a
restricted class of functions (e.g., intersections of halfspaces), then the learning problem is NP-hard with respect to ran-
domized reductions [3,5]. Klivans and Sherstov [19] have since obtained a 2Ω(
√
n) lower bound on the sample complexity of
learning intersections of
√
n halfspaces in the statistical query (SQ) model, an important restriction of the PAC model. Since
the SQ model is a restriction of PAC, the lower bounds in [19] do not imply hardness in the PAC model, the subject of this
paper. We are not aware of any other results on the diﬃculty of learning intersections of halfspaces.
We are also not aware of any representation-independent hardness results for PAC learning small-depth arithmetic
circuits. There is a long line of research establishing lower bounds on the query complexity of polynomial interpolation
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small representations as arithmetic circuits (see Section 5.1 for more details).
1.3. Our techniques
Our results exploit recent cryptosystems due to Regev [23,24], which improve on the security of the Ajtai–Dwork cryp-
tosystem [2]. These cryptosystems are based on the hardness of the well-studied lattice problems uSVP, SVP, and SIVP. As
pointed out in [24], an advantage of these problems is the equivalence of their worst-case and average-case complexity. In
other words, an eﬃcient algorithm for solving these problems on a nonnegligible (inverse-polynomial) fraction of instances
yields an eﬃcient algorithm for solving every instance. This contrasts with common number-theoretic problems such as
factoring or deciding quadratic residuosity. Furthermore, lattice-based cryptosystems feature decryption functions that are
completely different from modular exponentiation d(Y ) = Y D mod N , the decryption function that is at the heart of virtually
every number-theoretic cryptosystem. As a result, lattice-based cryptosystems imply hardness results that number-theoretic
cryptosystems have not yielded.
An established method [12] for obtaining hardness results for a concept class C is to demonstrate that C can compute
the decryption function of a public-key cryptosystem. Intersections of a polynomial number of halfspaces, however, cannot
compute the decryption functions of the cryptosystems that we use. In fact, the decryption functions in question contain
PARITY as a subfunction (see Section 6), which cannot be computed by intersections of a polynomial number of any unate
functions [19]. Furthermore, the decryption functions for Regev’s cryptosystems perform a division or an iterated addition,
which require threshold circuits of depth 3 and 2, respectively [29,32]. Threshold circuits of depth 2 and higher are known
to be more powerful than intersections of halfspaces.
To overcome these diﬃculties, we use nonuniform distributions on {0,1}n to help us with the computation. This tech-
nique allows us to use intersections of degree-2 polynomial threshold functions to compute the decryption function while still
obtaining a hardness result for intersections of halfspaces.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 covers technical preliminaries and provides a detailed
overview of the cryptosystems that we use. The crucial connection between learning and cryptography is the subject of
Section 3. The main ingredient of our proof is presented in Section 4 and is concerned with the construction of eﬃcient
circuits for the decryption functions of the cryptosystems. Section 5 establishes our main results, with further discussion in
Section 6.
2. Preliminaries
A halfspace in n dimensions is a Boolean function f : {0,1}n → {0,1} of the form
f (x) =
{
1 if a1x1 + a2x2 + · · · + anxn  θ,
0 otherwise,
where a1, . . . ,an, θ are some ﬁxed integers. It is well known that the absolute values of a1, . . . ,an, θ can be assumed to be at
most 2O (n logn) . The intersection of k halfspaces is a Boolean function g =∧ki=1 hi , where each hi is a halfspace. A polynomial
threshold function (PTF) of degree d is a Boolean function of the form
f (x) =
{
1 if p(x) 0,
0 otherwise,
where p is a degree-d polynomial in x1, x2, . . . , xn with integer coeﬃcients. Note that a halfspace is a PTF of degree 1. The
weight of a PTF f is the sum of the absolute values of the integer coeﬃcients of the associated polynomial p. A PTF is called
light if its weight is bounded by a polynomial in n. (Strictly speaking, this deﬁnition concerns not a single PTF but rather
an inﬁnite sequence f1, f2, . . . , fn, . . . of PTFs, one for each input length. For brevity, however, we will follow the general
convention of identifying a sequence of functions f1, f2, . . . , fn, . . . with its typical nth representative, fn .)
We adopt the probably approximately correct (PAC) model of learning, due to Valiant [30]. An overview of this model
is as follows. A concept class C is any set of Boolean functions {0,1}n → {0,1}. In the PAC model, one ﬁxes an arbitrary
target function f ∈C and a distribution μ on {0,1}n . The learner, who does not know f or μ, receives labeled examples
(x1, f (x1)), (x2, f (x2)), . . . , where x1, x2, . . . ∈ {0,1}n are chosen independently at random according to μ. The learner is
said to learn C if, given  ∈ (0,1) and poly(n, 1 ) labeled examples, it outputs a hypothesis h that with high probability has
Prx∼μ[ f (x) = h(x)] <  . We will be using a looser requirement called weak learning, which relaxes the success criterion to
Prx∼μ[ f (x) = h(x)] < 12 − 1nc for a constant c; for contrast, the original framework is known as strong learning. Throughout
this paper, “PAC learning” is a shorthand for PAC learning in polynomial time and under arbitrary distributions μ. In this
arbitrary-distribution setting, weak PAC learning is equivalent to strong PAC learning, and we will sometimes not draw
the distinction between the two in the development to follow. For further background on computational learning theory,
see [13].
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This subsection describes lattice-based cryptography and presents two relevant lattice-based cryptosystems due to
Regev [23,24]. A lattice in n dimensions is the set {a1v1 + · · · + anvn: a1, . . . ,an ∈ Z} of all integral linear combinations
of a given basis v1, . . . ,vn ∈ Rn . The primary problems on lattices are the unique shortest vector problem f (n)-uSVP, shortest
vector problem f (n)-SVP, and shortest independent vector problem f (n)-SIVP. In f (n)-uSVP, the goal is to ﬁnd a shortest
nonzero vector in the lattice, provided that it is shorter by a factor of at least f (n) than any other nonparallel vector. In
f (n)-SVP, the goal is to approximate the length of a shortest nonzero vector within a factor of f (n). Thus, uSVP is a special
case of SVP, distinguished by the “uniqueness” condition. Finally, in f (n)-SIVP, the goal is to output a set of n linearly
independent lattice vectors of length at most f (n) · opt, where opt is the minimum length over all sets of n linearly inde-
pendent vectors from the lattice (the length of a set is the length of its longest vector). Note that all three problems become
harder as the approximation factor 1 f (n) poly(n) decreases. We will be working with f (n) = O˜ (n1.5), an approximation
factor for which these three problems are believed to be hard (none of the above lattice problems are known to admit a
subexponential time solution for any setting of f (n) we consider in this paper).
We note here that there is a large body of work examining the hardness of these lattice problems depending on the
choice of f (n). Roughly speaking, certain variants of the shortest vector problem are known to be NP-hard if f (n) is chosen
to be a small constant. On the other hand, it is known that for larger values of f (n), such as
√
n, some lattice problems are
unlikely to be NP-hard (i.e., if they were NP-hard, the polynomial-time hierarchy would collapse). We refer the reader to
the excellent survey by Regev [27] for a detailed description of the hardness of these problems.
The cryptosystems below encrypt one-bit messages (0 and 1). Encryption is randomized; decryption is deterministic.
Let eK ,r : {0,1} → {0,1}poly(n) denote the encryption function corresponding to a choice of private and public keys K =
(Kpriv, Kpub) and a random string r. In discussing security, we will need the following notion.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Distinguisher). An algorithm A is said to distinguish between the encryptions of 0 and 1 if for some universal
constant c,∣∣∣Pr
K ,r
[
A
(
Kpub, eK ,r(1)
)= 1]− Pr
K ,r
[
A
(
Kpub, eK ,r(0)
)= 1]∣∣∣ 1
nc
.
We focus on those aspects of the cryptosystems that are relevant to the hardness proofs in this paper. For example,
we state the numeric ranges of public and private keys without describing the key generation procedure. We follow the
established convention of denoting polynomially-bounded quantities (in n) by lowercase letters, and superpolynomial ones
by capital letters.
2.2. The uSVP-based cryptosystem
We start with a cryptosystem, due to Regev [23], whose security is based on the worst-case hardness of uSVP. Let n
be the security parameter. Denote N = 28n2 and m = cn2, where c is a universal constant. Let γ (n) be any function with
γ (n) = ω(n√logn), where faster-growing functions γ correspond to worse security guarantees but also a lower probability
of decryption error.
Private key: A real number H with
√
N  H < 2
√
N .
Public key: A vector (A1, . . . , Am, i0), where i0 ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and each Ai ∈ {0, . . . ,N − 1}.
Encryption: To encrypt 0, pick a random set S ⊆ [m] and output ∑i∈S Ai mod N . To encrypt 1, pick a random set S ⊆ [m]
and output 	Ai0/2
 +
∑
i∈S Ai mod N .
Decryption: On receipt of W ∈ {0, . . . ,N − 1}, decrypt 0 if frac(WH/N) < 1/4, and 1 otherwise. Here frac(a)min{a −
a,a − 	a
} denotes the distance from a ∈ R to the closest integer. By a standard argument, the security and
correctness of the cryptosystem are unaffected if we change the decryption function to frac(AW ) < 1/4, where
A is a representation of H/N to within poly(n) fractional bits.
Correctness: The probability of decryption error (over the choice of private and public keys and the randomness in the
encryption) is 2−Ω(γ (n)2/m) .
Regev [23] showed that breaking the above cryptosystem would yield a polynomial-time algorithm for uSVP. A more
detailed statement follows (see Theorem 4.5 and Lemma 5.4 of [23]):
Theorem 2.2. (See Regev [23].) Assume that there is a polynomial-time distinguisher between the encryptions of 0 and 1. Then there
is a polynomial-time solution to every instance of (
√
n · γ (n))-uSVP.
We will set γ (n) = n logn to make the probability of decryption error negligible (inverse-superpolynomial) while guar-
anteeing O˜ (n1.5)-uSVP security. Regev’s cryptosystem thus improves on the public-key cryptosystem of Ajtai and Dwork [2]
whose security is based on the worst-case hardness of O (n8)-uSVP, an easier problem than O˜ (n1.5)-uSVP.
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The second cryptosystem [24] is based on the worst-case quantum hardness of SVP and SIVP. Let n be the security
parameter. Denote by p a prime with n2 < p < 2n2, and let m = 5(n + 1)(1 + 2 logn). Let γ (n) be any function with
γ (n) = ω(√n logn), where faster-growing functions γ correspond to worse security guarantees but also a lower probability
of decryption error.
Private key: A vector s ∈ Znp .
Public key: A sequence of pairs (a1,b1), . . . , (am,bm), where each ai ∈ Znp and bi ∈ Zp .
Encryption: To encrypt 0, pick S ⊆ [m] randomly and output (∑i∈S ai,∑i∈S bi). To encrypt 1, pick S ⊆ [m] randomly and
output (
∑
i∈S ai, 	p/2
 +
∑
i∈S bi). (All arithmetic is modulo p.)
Decryption: On receipt of (a,b) ∈ Znp ×Zp , decrypt 0 if b−〈a, s〉 is closer to 0 than to 	p/2
 modulo p. Decrypt 1 otherwise.
(All arithmetic is modulo p.)
Correctness: The probability of decryption error (over the choice of private and public keys and the randomness in the
encryption) is 2−Ω(γ (n)2/m) .
Regev [24] showed that breaking the above cryptosystem would imply a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for solving
SVP and SIVP. A more precise statement is as follows (see Theorem 3.1 and Lemmas 4.4, 5.4 of [24]):
Theorem 2.3. (See Regev [24].) Assume that there is a polynomial-time (possibly quantum) algorithm for distinguishing between the
encryptions of 0 and 1. Then there is a polynomial-time quantum solution to O˜ (n · γ (n))-SVP and O˜ (n · γ (n))-SIVP.
We adopt the setting γ (n) = √n log2 n to make the probability of decryption error negligible while guaranteeing O˜ (n1.5)-
SVP and O˜ (n1.5)-SIVP security. Observe that this second cryptosystem is preferable to the ﬁrst in that it is based on the
worst-case hardness of a more general lattice problem (SVP vs. uSVP). The disadvantage of the second cryptosystem is
that breaking it would only yield a quantum algorithm for SVP, as opposed to the ﬁrst cryptosystem which would yield a
classical algorithm for uSVP.
3. Learning decryption functions vs. breaking cryptosystems
In their seminal paper [12], Kearns and Valiant established a key relationship between the security of a public-key
cryptosystem and the hardness of learning an associated concept class. We re-derive it below for completeness and extend it
to allow for errors in the decryption process. This link is a natural consequence of the ease of encrypting messages with the
public key. A large pool of such encryptions can be viewed as a set of training examples for learning the decryption function.
But learning the decryption function to a nonnegligible advantage would mean breaking the cryptosystem. Assuming that
the cryptosystem is secure, we can thus conclude that it is not feasible to learn the decryption function. We formalize this
observation in the following lemma:
Lemma 3.1 (Cryptography and learning; cf. Kearns and Valiant [12]). Consider a public-key cryptosystem for encrypting individual
bits by n-bit strings. Let C be a concept class that contains all the decryption functions dK : {0,1}n → {0,1} of the cryptosystem, one
for each choice of key K = (Kpriv, Kpub). Let ε(n) = PrK ,r[dK (eK ,r(0)) = 0 or dK (eK ,r(1)) = 1] be the probability of decryption error
(over the choice of keys and randomization in the encryption). IfC is weakly PAC-learnable in time t(n) with t(n)ε(n) = 1/nω(1) , then
there is a distinguisher between the encryptions of 0 and 1 that runs in time O (t(n)).
Proof. For a pair of keys K = (Kpriv, Kpub), let eK ,r : {0,1} → {0,1}n be the randomized encryption function (indexed by
the choice of random string r). Let dK : {0,1}n → {0,1} denote the matching decryption function. We will use the assumed
learnability of C to exhibit an algorithm A that runs in time O (t(n)) and has
Pr
K ,r
[
A
(
Kpub, eK ,r(1)
)= 1]− Pr
K ,r
[
A
(
Kpub, eK ,r(0)
)= 1] 1
nc
for some universal constant c, as long as t(n)ε(n) = 1/nω(1) . The probability is taken over the choice of keys, randomness in
the encryption, and any internal randomization in A . It follows that A is the desired distinguisher.
Algorithm A takes as input a pair (Kpub,w), where w ∈ {0,1}n is the encryption of an unknown bit. First, A draws
t(n) independent training examples, choosing each as follows:
(1) Pick b = 0 or b = 1, with equal probability.
(2) Pick r, an unbiased random string.
(3) Create a training example 〈eK ,r(b),b〉.
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i.e., the decryption function dK is consistent with all the generated examples. Then the learning algorithm outputs a hy-
pothesis h that approximates dK with a nonnegligible advantage:
Pr
b,r
[
h
(
eK ,r(b)
)= dK (eK ,r(b))] 1
2
+ 1
nc
, (3.1)
for some constant c. With this hypothesis in hand, algorithm A outputs h(w) and exits.2
It remains to show that A is indeed a distinguisher. We will ﬁrst handle the case in which no decryption error occurs;
call this event E . Then:
Pr
K ,r
[
A
(
Kpub, eK ,r(1)
)= 1 ∣∣ E ]− Pr
K ,r
[
A
(
Kpub, eK ,r(0)
)= 1 ∣∣ E ]
= Pr
K ,r
[
h
(
eK ,r(1)
)= 1]− Pr
K ,r
[
h
(
eK ,r(0)
)= 1]
= 2 Pr
K ,b,r
[
h
(
eK ,r(b)
)= b]− 1
 2
(
Pr
K ,b,r
[
h
(
eK ,r(b)
)= dK (eK ,r(b))]− Pr
K ,b,r
[
dK
(
eK ,r(b)
) = b])− 1
 1+ 2
nc
− 2ε(n) − 1
= 2
nc
− 2ε(n).
We now extend the analysis to account for possible decryption errors. Observe that the likelihood of a decryption error
on a run of A is small:
Pr[E ] = EK
[
Pr[E | K ]]
 EK
[
t(n) · Pr
b,r
[
dK
(
eK ,r(b)
) = b ∣∣ K ]] (by union bound)
= t(n) · Pr
K ,b,r
[
dK
(
eK ,r(b)
) = b]
 t(n)ε(n).
This upper bound on Pr[E ], along with the above analysis of the error-free case, allows us to complete the proof of the
desired claim (for all n large enough):
Pr
K ,r
[
A
(
Kpub, eK ,r(1)
)= 1]− Pr
K ,r
[
A
(
Kpub, eK ,r(0)
)= 1]

(
Pr
K ,r
[
A
(
Kpub, eK ,r(1)
)= 1 ∣∣ E ]− Pr
K ,r
[
A
(
Kpub, eK ,r(0)
)= 1 ∣∣ E ])− 2Pr[E ]
 2
nc
− 2ε(n) − 2t(n)ε(n)
 1
nc
. 
4. Implementing the decryption functions
Section 3 demonstrated that if a public-key cryptosystem is secure, then no concept class that can implement its de-
cryption function is eﬃciently PAC-learnable. In what follows, we obtain implementations of the decryption functions from
Section 2 by intersections of degree-2 PTFs. This will lead to a hardness result for learning intersections of degree-2 PTFs.
We will obtain the main result of the paper by noting that intersections of degree-2 PTFs are no harder to learn than are
intersections of halfspaces, a claim we formalize next.
Lemma 4.1. Assume that intersections of n arbitrary (respectively, light) halfspaces are weakly PAC-learnable. Then for any constant
c > 0, intersections of nc arbitrary (respectively, light) degree-2 PTFs are weakly PAC-learnable.
Proof. We will prove the “light” case only; the “arbitrary” case is analogous. Consider the following concept classes:
2 We have assumed that, given consistent training examples, the learner is guaranteed to succeed in ﬁnding a hypothesis h that satisﬁes (3.1). This
makes for a shorter and simpler proof. In reality, we need only assume that the learner succeeds with probability 1/poly(n), and outputs “FAIL” otherwise.
To accommodate this more general setting, it suﬃces to have A output a random value (0 or 1) whenever the learner fails.
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C ′: intersections of n light degree-2 PTFs;
C ′′: intersections of nc light degree-2 PTFs.
First observe that a polynomial-time PAC-learning algorithm for C implies one for C ′ . This is because a degree-2 PTF in the
n variables x1, . . . , xn is a halfspace in the n+
(n
2
)
variables x1, . . . , xn, x1x2, x1x3, . . . , xn−1xn , which yields a polynomial-time
map from training/testing examples for a degree-2 PTF to those for a halfspace. This map is naturally viewed as a change of
distribution: a given distribution of (x1, . . . , xn) will induce another, nonuniform distribution in the n +
(n
2
)
new variables.
Finally, a polynomial-time learning algorithm for C ′ implies one for C ′′: by a standard padding argument, the problem
of PAC learning the intersection of nc halfspaces reduces to n halfspaces for any constant c > 0. 
4.1. The uSVP-based cryptosystem
Recall that frac(a)min{a−a,a−	a
} denotes the distance from a ∈ R to the closest integer. Throughout this section,
{a} stands for the fractional part of a ∈ R. Deﬁne the Boolean predicate
NEAR-INT(a) = 1 ⇐⇒ frac(a) < 1/4.
This predicate ignores the integral part of a, meaning that NEAR-INT(a) = NEAR-INT({a}).
The decryption function in the uSVP-based cryptosystem (Section 2) is dA(W ) = NEAR-INT(AW ), where A is a ﬁxed
real number and W is an integer input, both with a polynomial number of bits. We will demonstrate how to implement
NEAR-INT(AW ) with intersections of degree-2 PTFs. A critical ingredient of our implementation is the “interval trick” of
Siu and Roychowdhury [29], an insightful idea that was used in [29] to obtain a depth-2 light-weight threshold circuit for
iterated addition.
Lemma 4.2 (Implementing the uSVP-based decryption function). Let A > 0 be a real number with k fractional bits. Then the function
f (x) = NEAR-INT(A∑n−1j=0 x j2 j) can be computed by the intersection of k PTFs with degree 2 and weight O (k44k).
Proof. Let {A} = .b1b2 . . .bk be the fractional part of A in binary, with bi ∈ {0,1} for all i. The integral part of A is irrelevant.
Then {
A
n−1∑
j=0
x j2
j
}
=
{
k∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=0
bix j2
j−i
}
=
{
k∑
i=1
min{n−1,i−1}∑
j=0
bix j2
j−i
}
,
where the last equation follows by dropping those terms bix j2 j−i that are whole numbers. Denote
S(x)
k∑
i=1
min{n−1,i−1}∑
j=0
bix j2
j−i
so that {A∑n−1j=0 x j2 j} = {S(x)}. Observe that S(x) is a multiple of 1/2k and ranges between 0 and k. We will use degree-2
PTFs to identify intervals in [0,k] on which NEAR-INT(S(x)) = 1. A listing of the ﬁrst few such intervals is as follows:
Value of S(x) in binary NEAR-INT(S(x))
. 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
.
.
.
. 0 0 1 1 . . . 1 1
1
. 0 1 0 0 . . . 0 0
.
.
.
. 1 1 0 0 . . . 0 0
0
. 1 1 0 0 . . . 0 1
.
.
.
1 . 0 0 1 1 . . . 1 1
1
1 . 0 1 0 0 . . . 0 0
.
.
.
1 . 1 1 0 0 . . . 0 0
0
1 . 1 1 0 0 . . . 0 1
.
.
.
1 0 . 0 0 1 1 . . . 1 1
1
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S(x) − a + b
2
)2

(
b − a
2
)2
,
whose integral representation has weight O (k44k). To compute the negation of an interval, we replace the inequality sign
by “>.” Finally, there are at most 2k + 1 intervals because every two consecutive intervals, starting at the second, cover a
distance of 1 on the interval [0,k]. By AND’ing the negations of the k intervals on which NEAR-INT(S(x)) = 0, we obtain the
desired f as an AND of k weight-O (k44k) degree-2 PTFs. 
4.2. SVP- and SIVP-based cryptosystems
For an integer a, deﬁne the Boolean predicate
NEAR-MIDp(a) ⇐⇒
∣∣b − 	p/2
∣∣min{b, p − b},
where b ∈ {0,1, . . . , p − 1} is the integer with a ≡ b (mod p). Recall that the decryption function in the SVP- and SIVP-
based cryptosystem (Section 2) is ds1,...,sn (b,a1, . . . ,an) = NEAR-MIDp(b −
∑
aisi), where all si,ai , and b are integers in
{0, . . . , p − 1} = Zp . We will show how to compute ds1,...,sn with intersections of degree-2 PTFs.
Lemma 4.3 (Implementing the SVP- and SIVP-based decryption function). Let ds1,...,sn : ({0,1}log p)n+1 → {0,1} be the Boolean
function deﬁned by
ds1,...,sn (x) = NEAR-MIDp
( log p−1∑
i=0
2i x0,i −
n∑
j=1
s j
log p−1∑
i=0
2i x j,i
)
,
where all si are integers in {0, . . . , p − 1}. Then ds1,...,sn can be computed by the intersection of n log p PTFs with degree 2 and
weight O ((pn log p)2).
Proof. Denote
S(x)
log p−1∑
i=0
2i x0,i −
n∑
j=1
log p−1∑
i=0
(
2i s j mod p
)
x j,i .
Thus, S(x) is the original weighted sum (
∑log p−1
i=0 2
i x0,i −∑nj=1 s j∑log p−1i=0 2i x j,i) with the coeﬃcients reduced modulo p.
Using the deﬁnition of NEAR-MIDp , we have ds1,...,sn (x) = NEAR-MIDp(S(x)). The integer S(x) ranges between −(p −
1)n log p and p − 1, a total range of length < pn log p. As in the proof of Lemma 4.2, this range can be divided into
consecutive intervals on which ds1,...,sn (x) is constant (i.e., does not change value within an interval).
Every two consecutive intervals cover a length of p units. Thus, there are a total of  2(pn log p)/p = 2n log p consecutive
intervals. By picking out the n log p intervals on which ds1,...,sn (x) = 0 and AND’ing their negations, we can compute ds1,...,sn
exactly. It remains to note that the negation of an interval [a,b] can be computed by a degree-2 weight-O ((pn log p)2) PTF
of the form (S(x) − a+b2 )2 > ( b−a2 )2. 
We additionally observe that the decryption function in the SVP- and SIVP-based cryptosystem can be computed by a
depth-3 arithmetic circuit.
Lemma 4.4 (Extension to arithmetic circuits). Let ds1,...,sn : ({0,1}log p)n+1 → {0,1} be the Boolean function deﬁned by
ds1,...,sn (x) = NEAR-MIDp
( log p−1∑
i=0
2i x0,i −
n∑
j=1
s j
log p−1∑
i=0
2i x j,i
)
,
where all si are integers in {0, . . . , p − 1}. Then ds1,...,sn can be computed by a depth-3 arithmetic circuit of size poly(p,n).
Proof. Set S(x) as in the proof of Lemma 4.3. Then S(x) is an integer in the range R  [−(p − 1)n log p, p − 1] ∩ Z and
completely determines the target function: ds1,...,sn (x) = NEAR-MIDp(S(x)).
Let g be a polynomial such that g(S(x)) = ds1,...,sn (x) for all Boolean inputs x. It can be constructed by interpolating
ds1,...,sn on the range of S(x) via the Lagrange formula:
g(y) =
∑
r∈R
NEAR-MIDp(r) ·
∏
r′∈R, r′ =r
y − r′
r − r′ .
Since the range R contains poly(p,n) integers, g(S(x)) can be computed by a depth-3 arithmetic circuit of size poly(p,n)
with input S(x) and summation gates at the bottom. But S(x) is a sum of poly(p,n) terms, each a singleton variable xi or a
constant. Thus, ds1,...,sn can be computed directly by a depth-3 arithmetic circuit of size poly(p,n) with inputs x. 
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Based on the assumed hardness of the cryptosystems in Section 2 and the learning-to-cryptography reductions of Sec-
tions 3 and 4, we are in a position to prove the desired hardness results for learning intersections of halfspaces.
Theorem 1.1. (Restated from page 3.) Assume that intersections of n halfspaces in n dimensions are PAC-learnable for some constant
 > 0. Then there is a polynomial-time solution to O˜ (n1.5)-uSVP.
Proof. Let C denote the concept class of intersections of n halfspaces, and let C ′ denote the concept class of intersections
of nc degree-2 PTFs (for a large enough constant c > 0). By Lemma 4.1, the assumed PAC-learnability of C implies the PAC-
learnability of C ′ . By Lemma 4.2, all the decryption functions in the uSVP-based cryptosystem are in C ′ . A PAC-learning
algorithm for C ′ would thus yield a distinguisher between the encryptions of 0 and 1 (by Lemma 3.1) and hence an eﬃcient
solution to O (
√
n · γ (n))-uSVP for γ (n) = n logn (by Theorem 2.2). 
Remark 5.1. Oded Regev has informed us [25] that Theorem 1.1 is also valid for light halfspaces, rather than arbitrary ones
as stated. To see this, note that in Regev’s ﬁrst cryptosystem (Lemma 5.2 of [23]), except with probability exponentially small
in n, the quantity frac(AW ) is bounded away from 14 by a small constant. Therefore, with extremely high probability, we
can ignore many of the least signiﬁcant bits of AW , as these bits can only change the value of AW by o(1). In Lemma 4.2,
this allows one to restrict the sum S(x) to contain only terms bix j2 j−i with j − i > −C logn (for a suﬃciently large constant
C > 0), since the remaining terms contribute at most o(1). The integral representation of the resulting PTF would have
polynomial weight, leading to hardness for intersections of light halfspaces.
Theorem 1.2. (Restated from page 3.) Assume that intersections of n light halfspaces in n dimensions are PAC-learnable for some
constant  > 0. Then there is a polynomial-time quantum solution to O˜ (n1.5)-SVP and O˜ (n1.5)-SIVP.
Proof. Let C denote the concept class of intersections of n light halfspaces, and let C ′ denote the concept class of inter-
sections of nc light degree-2 PTFs (for a large enough constant c > 0). By Lemma 4.1, the assumed PAC-learnability of C
implies the PAC-learnability of C ′ . By Lemma 4.3, the decryption function in the uSVP-based cryptosystem is in C ′ . A PAC-
learning algorithm for C ′ would thus yield a distinguisher between the encryptions of 0 and 1 (by Lemma 3.1) and, as a
result, an eﬃcient quantum solution to O˜ (n · γ (n))-SVP and O˜ (n · γ (n))-SIVP for γ (n) = √n log2 n (by Theorem 2.3). 
Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 both imply a hardness result for learning polynomial-size depth-2 circuits of majority gates, a con-
cept class commonly denoted by L̂T2. To prove this, we will need a result regarding light threshold circuits, due to Goldmann,
Håstad, and Razborov [9] and Goldmann and Karpinski [10]. Let L̂Td denote the class of depth-d polynomial-size circuits of
threshold gates with polynomially-bounded weights. Let L˜Td denote the class of depth-d polynomial-size threshold circuits
in which only the output gate is required to have polynomially-bounded weights.
Theorem 5.2. (See [9,10].) For any ﬁxed integer d, L̂Td = L˜Td.
We are now in a position to prove the desired hardness result for depth-2 neural networks.
Theorem 1.3. (Restated from page 3.) Assume that depth-2 polynomial-size circuits of majority gates are PAC learnable. Then there is
a polynomial-time solution to O˜ (n1.5)-uSVP and polynomial-time quantum solutions to O˜ (n1.5)-SVP and O˜ (n1.5)-SIVP.
Proof. Let
∧
L̂T1 (respectively,
∧
LT1) denote the concept classes of intersections of polynomially many light (respectively,
arbitrary) halfspaces. By Theorems 1.1 and 1.2, it suﬃces to show that
∧
L̂T1 ⊆ L̂T2 and ∧LT1 ⊆ L̂T2. The ﬁrst state-
ment is obvious: each halfspace is already a majority gate (with the inputs suitably negated/replicated), and the top gate
AND( f1, f2, . . . , ft) can be replaced by a majority gate MAJ(−t, f1, f2, . . . , ft). To prove that ∧LT1 ⊆ L̂T2, observe that∧
LT1 ⊆ L˜T2 (by an argument similar to the ﬁrst case) and L˜T2 = L̂T2 (by Theorem 5.2). 
5.1. Hardness for PAC learning arithmetic circuits
Here we give a hardness result for PAC learning depth-3 arithmetic circuits over the integers. Many researchers have
constructed eﬃcient, sparse polynomial interpolation algorithms where the learner has query access to the unknown poly-
nomial [20,22,28]. If, in addition to membership queries, the learner can make equivalence queries, Klivans and Shpilka [16]
have shown how to exactly learn restricted types of depth-3 arithmetic circuits via multiplicity automata techniques [4].
We show that if the learner receives random examples only, then learning depth-3 polynomial-size arithmetic circuits is as
hard as solving O˜ (n1.5)-SVP in quantum polynomial-time:
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Then there is a polynomial-time quantum solution to O˜ (n1.5)-SVP and O˜ (n1.5)-SIVP.
Proof. Invoke Lemma 4.4 and argue as before (see the proofs of Theorems 1.1 and 1.2). 
6. Hardness for AC0?
A natural question to ask is whether our approach could yield hardness results for other concept classes. Particularly
interesting candidates are AC0 and, more ambitiously, polynomial-size DNF formulas. Here we prove that the decryption
functions of Regev’s cryptosystems contain PARITY as a subfunction and thus are not computable in AC0.
We start with the easier proof. Recall that the decryption function of the SVP- and SIVP-based cryptosystem is
f s1,...,sn (a1, . . . ,an,b) = NEAR-MIDp(b−
∑
aisi), where all si,ai , and b are integers in {0, . . . , p − 1} = Zp with n2 < p < 2n2.
Proposition 6.1 (SVP-, SIVP-based cryptosystem and AC0). The decryption function of the SVP- and SIVP-based cryptosystem,
fs1,...,sn (a1, . . . ,an,b) = NEAR-MIDp(b −
∑
aisi), is not in AC0 .
Proof. Let x1, x2, . . . , xn ∈ {0,1}n . Note that
NEAR-MIDp
(
p − 1
2
∑
xi
)
= NEAR-MIDp
(
p
2
∑
xi
)
= PARITY(x1, . . . , xn).
The ﬁrst equality holds because 12
∑
xi  n2  p. Thus, PARITY(x1, . . . , xn) is a subfunction of NEAR-MIDp(b −
∑
aisi). Since
AC0 cannot compute PARITY [8,11], the claim follows. 
Recall now that the decryption function in the uSVP-based cryptosystem is dA(X) = NEAR-INT(AX), where A is a ﬁxed
real number and X is an integer input. For convenience, we assume that X has n + 1 bits rather than n.
Proposition 6.2 (uSVP-based cryptosystem and AC0). The decryption function of the uSVP-based cryptosystem, dA(X) =
NEAR-INT(AX), is not in AC0 .
Proof. We will show that dA(X) computes PARITY on a subset of Θ(n/ logn) bits from among x1, . . . , xn (when the other
bits are set to 0). The claim will follow.
Let Δ 3+ logn and A∑n/Δi=0 2−iΔ−1. For convenience of notation, we assume that Δ | n. In what follows, we show
that dA(X) = PARITY(x0, xΔ, x2Δ, . . . , xn) when xi = 0 for all i /∈ {0,Δ,2Δ, . . . ,n}. Namely,
dA(X) = NEAR-INT(AX)
= NEAR-INT
(( n/Δ∑
i=0
1
2iΔ+1
)( n/Δ∑
j=0
x jΔ2
jΔ
))
= NEAR-INT
(∑
i
∑
j>i
x jΔ2 jΔ
2iΔ+1
+
∑
i
xiΔ2iΔ
2iΔ+1
+
∑
i
∑
j<i
x jΔ2 jΔ
2iΔ+1
)
.
The ﬁrst summation features only whole numbers and can thus be dropped. The second summation is precisely 12 (x0 + xΔ +
x2Δ + · · · + xn), a multiple of 12 . The third summation does not exceed 1/8 (by the choice of Δ and the geometric series)
and thus does not affect the result. We obtain:
dA(X) = NEAR-INT
(
x0 + xΔ + x2Δ + · · · + xn
2
)
.
The latter expression is clearly PARITY(x0, xΔ, x2Δ, . . . , xn). 
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